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The grand opposition between theories of the mind which is presented in this book will be
familiar, in its broad outlines, to many readers. On the one side we have the Cartesians,
who understand the mind in terms of representation, causation and the inner life; on the
other we have the Wittgensteinians, who understand the mind in terms of activity,
normativity and its external embedding in its bodily and social environment. In this
book—one of a pair, the second of which has yet to be translated—Vincent Descombes
puts up a spirited defence of the Wittgensteinian approach. The Cartesian approach,
which he calls ‘mental philosophy’, and which is exemplified most typically in the
‘cognitivism’ of Jerry Fodor, is fundamentally mistaken, he argues, since it underestimates,
neglects or ignores both the active and external characteristics of the mind.1 Instead we
should2 understand the mind in terms of a human being’s participation in a culture or a
‘form of life’, a form of engagement which is structured by norms rather than causal laws.
This ‘anthropological holism’ draws not only upon the work of Wittgenstein, but also on
Le´vi-Strauss, Lacan and, among other things, on the role of fiction in shaping our self-
understanding.
Cognitivism is that manifestation of ‘mental philosophy’ which attempts to construct a
systematic science of the mind based upon the notions of representation, causation and
law (p. 66). As characterised by Descombes, it is a sorry sight indeed. It understands the
mind as ‘utterly separate from the world’, as a passive receiver of empty, meaningless
causal signals from the world outside, and therefore as trapped within what Heidegger
calls an ‘inner sphere’. This is because, according to cognitivism, ‘psychology has a
justification precisely in the fact that the psychological subject does not have a direct
relation to things but only to its representation of things’ (p. 10); and this is ultimately why
‘the psychology of a representing mind is a cognitive psychology but without cognition
proper’ (p. 16). At its worst, cognitivism collapses into a form of solipsism (p. 220).
Such a picture of the mind runs counter to all of our experience. It does not seem to me
that I am in perceptual and cognitive contact only with representations, in such a way that
I have to (for example) infer the existence of things around me. On the contrary, it seems to
me that I am here in the world alongside the things I am thinking about and perceiving. I
do not experience my mental life as that of a mere spectator of the passing show; I am
actively engaged with the world and my ability to act is so tied up, phenomenologically
speaking, with my abilities to perceive and think that I find it hard to draw sharp lines
between them. I feel myself to be an embodied agent, immersed in the social world around
me and directly engaging with it. And I am sure you feel the same way yourself.
The picture of the mind which Descombes characterises as cognitivist therefore
appears, at first sight, phenomenologically unrealistic to the point of absurdity. If the
phenomenological observations just made are at all on the right lines, then any theory
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which is attempting to save the mental phenomena and yet gives no account of them will
have to be rejected. So if cognitivism is committed to the denial of these phenomenological
claims, one might reasonably wonder why anyone would try to defend cognitivism in the
first place. Unfortunately, Descombes does not do much to answer this question; one of the
shortcomings of his book is its failure to present the view he is opposing in a way which
makes it in any way plausible. Here I will not try to remedy this deficiency (see Crane 2003
for a more sympathetic presentation for the motivation for cognitivism). Rather, I will look
more closely at two central ideas in Descombes’s presentation of cognitivism: the idea that
the mind is separate from the world, and the idea that the mind is inactive. According to
anthropological holism, by contrast, the mind is external and active. In focussing on these
central themes of externality and activity, I will inevitably have to ignore some of the many
interesting aspects of Descombes’s anthropological holism.
First, externality. What might it mean to say that the mind is something ‘utterly separate
from the world’? According to one interpretation, a mind that is separate from the world is
something like a Cartesian soul, defined as something which is capable of independent
existence, and therefore whose cognitive and epistemic links with reality are precarious.
This was not, of course, the way that Descartes would have described his own view, given
both his understanding of the causal relationship between body and mind, and his
conception of our knowledge of the world. But nor is it a description that contemporary
cognitivists would accept. Cognitivists are, as Descombes recognises, naturalists—and
whatever else this means, it certainly means that they think the mind is a natural or
physical object, the product (as it may be) of natural selection and subject to natural law.
Perhaps a better way to fill out the description of the mind as ‘separate from the world’,
and one which Descombes himself discusses later in the book, is by saying that
psychological states are narrow in Hilary Putnam’s (1975) sense: that their ascriptions do
not entail the existence of anything other than the subject to whom they are ascribed. The
idea is that being in a state of mind does not entail the existence of anything other than its
subject, and therefore in this sense the mind is separate from the world: logically or
metaphysically separable.
Of course, being separable in this sense is compatible with being connected causally,
and cognitivists will typically say that the mind is causally connected to the rest of reality.
But it may be responded, by someone who defends this understanding of ‘separateness
from the world’, that causal connection to the world is not what matters; what matters is a
constitutive or conceptual or metaphysical connection to the world, and narrow states do
not have this kind of connection. This distinction is certainly worth making; but the trouble
with defining cognitivism in terms of its commitment to narrow states of mind is that the
orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind for the last twenty years or so has been strongly
opposed to the idea of narrow states of mind. (Or rather, the orthodoxy is strongly
opposed to the view that all states of mind are narrow.) So if cognitivism is defined in
terms of separateness from the world, and separateness from the world is defined in terms
of narrowness, then most contemporary philosophy of mind is not cognitivist. The
dominant philosophy of mind, among the kind of reductionist theories Descombes aims to
attack, is ‘externalist’ in character (see Crane 2001 chapter 4 for a survey). So Descombes is
either attacking a very unpopular thesis, or he has mischaracterised his target. I suspect
the latter is the case, and the externalist tendencies of contemporary philosophy of mind
do not remove this philosophy from belonging to the style of theorising which Descombes
calls ‘mental philosophy’.
However, even if such theories do not believe in narrow states, they may still be
vulnerable to the other kinds of criticism he brings against mental philosophy—for
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example, that it is insufficiently holistic. So it may well be that ‘narrow-mindedness’ is not
essential to mental philosophy, or even to cognitivism. But what I want to focus on is not
this question, but rather the puzzling fact that Descombes’s conclusions about the mind
being separate from the world at the end of his book are in clear conflict with some of the
things he says at the beginning of his book about the phenomenon of intentionality.
Descombes (correctly, in my opinion) places the concept of intentionality at the centre of
his philosophy of mind (pp. 19–29). The most puzzling—but also one of the most
philosophically fascinating—aspects of the concept of intentionality is its merely apparent
relationality: thoughts and other intentional acts are not relations to their objects, even
though they appear to be. One reason for this is that, as Brentano put it, ‘if someone thinks
of something, the one who is thinking must certainly exist, but the object of his thinking
need not exist at all’ (1874: 272). Assuming that relations imply the existence of their relata,
then Brentano’s point clearly entails that intentionality is not a relation. Descombes agrees:
‘one cannot . . . conceive of intentionality as a relation between subject and object’ (p. 25;
see also p. 28). Like many philosophers, he thinks that this apparent relationality has to be
explained in terms of the modification of individual acts or states of mind: ‘When someone
thinks about [e.g.] the present Director of the Opera, there is no relationship between a
subject and an object but simply the determination of the act of thought by an intellectual
content’ (p. 24).
Descombes’s emphasis on the importance of intentionality and on its fundamentally
non-relational character seems to me to be absolutely the right way to approach these
issues. Unfortunately, however, he muddies the waters somewhat when he introduces the
relationship between the phenomenological notion of intentionality and the grammatical
notion of transitivity. When he introduces the notion of intentionality, he claims that
traditional formulations of this notion, like ‘anyone who thinks must think something’,
obscure ‘the decisive issue by conflating the intentionality of acts or mental states with a
certain grammatical transitivity or property by which certain verbs require a direct object.
Yet the notion of intentionality is useful precisely to the extent that it allows us to avoid
conflating the grammar of psychological verbs . . . with those of ordinary transitive verbs’
(p. 22). He concludes that the non-relational character of intentionality shows that
intentionality ‘is in no way a kind of transitivity’ (p. 22). For ‘if we were to take at face
value the apparent transitivity of intentional verbs, we would have to say that the act
signified by such verbs always has an object even when it doesn’t’ (p. 25; original emphasis).
Well, yes and no. Intentional verbs are transitive—that is, they take direct objects—and
there is no need for a philosopher of intentionality to deny this. What they must deny, as
Anscombe showed some years ago, is that ‘object’ in the phrase ‘direct object’ means the
same as ‘object’ in the sense of thing (see Anscombe 1965;for some discussion, see Crane
2001 chapter 1). This is not an ad hoc stipulation, but rather derives from the etymology of
the grammatical term ‘object’ (see Smith 2002 chapter 8). So in the sentence ‘Vladimir is
thinking of a unicorn’, the phrase ‘a unicorn’ gives the direct object of the sentence. The
sentence does not express a relation between Vladimir and any real thing, since there are
no unicorns; but this is consistent with saying that ‘thinks of’ is a transitive verb. Once we
distinguish the grammatical question from the metaphysical one, we can see that there is
no inconsistency in saying that intentional verbs are transitive and also that they do not
express relations. Of course, this is not the end of the matter, and a proper understanding
of intentionality must offer an understanding of the puzzling phenomenon of thinking
about objects which do not exist. To lessen the sense of paradox which Descombes tries to
draw out, we might say instead that ‘the act signified by an intentional verb always has an
intentional object even when it doesn’t have a real object’. There is still a puzzle here; but
Reviews 401
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004
puzzlement is not removed if we deny, as Descombes does, the obvious fact that
intentional verbs are transitive.
Nonetheless, Descombes’s remarks about the non-relational character of intentionality
are surely on the right track. It is therefore somewhat strange that he does not
consider the relation between this claim and his main arguments for the view that the
mind is not ‘detached’ from the world (in chapter 11). Descombes begins by observing that
a belief, for example, would be the same state of mind regardless of its truth-value: the
truth-value of a belief is not essential to it (p. 218). He then argues that the narrow
conception of mental states does not follow from the fact that subjects can be in error in
their beliefs:
There is nothing particularly Cartesian (or representationist) about declaring that
there is no difference between someone who believes that p and happens to
be right and someone who believes that p and is wrong. Everyone grants this.
(p. 218)
This is, of course, quite correct; one cannot argue for narrow states of mind simply from
the existence of error. Descombes goes on:
What is Cartesian about the argument . . . is that it posits no difference, from the
cognitive perspective of what is present to the mind, between someone who sees
a piece of paper and someone who believes he sees a piece of paper. (p. 219)
But if we compare this quotation with the one from p. 218 above, then a tension begins to
emerge. For suppose we replace ‘p’ with ‘There is a piece of paper here’. Then we have:
(A) There is nothing particularly Cartesian (or representationist) about declaring
that there is no difference between someone who believes that there is a piece of
paper here and happens to be right and someone who believes that there is a
piece of paper here, and is wrong.
Now if it makes sense to suppose that perceptual experience has a propositional content—
that is, that a perceptual experiential state can be attributed to a subject S by saying things
of the form ‘S experiences that p’—then we can replace ‘believes’ with ‘experiences’ in the
passage above, and obtain the following:
(B) There is nothing particularly Cartesian (or representationist) about declaring
that there is no difference between someone who experiences that there is a piece
of paper here and happens to be right and someone who experiences that there is
a piece of paper here and is wrong.
I think Descombes would say that (A) is true and (B) is false. This is because he would say
that the idea that there is a psychological identity between perception and a hallucination
is a Cartesian idea, given what ‘Cartesian’ means in this context. But the move from (A) to
(B) only relies on the assumption that perceptual experience, like belief, has an intentional
content, and that this content, like the content of belief, can be correct or incorrect. Now
Descombes may wish to reject this assumption, along with contemporary disjunctivists
(see McDowell 1987, Martin 2002). But he does not argue for this rejection, and without
such an argument, he leaves himself without a way of blocking the move from (A) to (B).
Descombes does seem to agree with disjunctivists that perception must be understood
relationally, and that this is what it means for perception to be direct. In the case of
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perceptual error, he says, perception ‘ceases to be direct and becomes an act of cogitation.
The perceiving subject is not in relation with a piece of paper but is only having
the experience of seeing one’ (p. 219). So perception, properly understood, is a relation to
the environment, whereas belief is not. This is, in itself, not such a remarkable claim; as
I have just noted, it is at the heart of the disjunctive theory of appearances. What is more
remarkable is the passage that follows this claim:
A new concept of representation has thus emerged: the idea that there is a common
core to the representation of someone who sees a sheet of paper and the
representation of someone who merely believes he is seeing one. This is the
solipsistic, narrow conception of a mental state: one can see a sheet of paper
without there being a sheet of paper in much the same way that one can be afraid
of the bogeyman when no bogeyman is present. (p. 219; original emphasis)
Descombes goes on to describe this new concept of representation as the concept of
‘representations that represent nothing . . . Nothing is represented’ (p. 220; p. 222; original
emphasis). This is obviously an instance of the sort of thing he means by his earlier claim
that ‘the psychology of a representing mind is a cognitive psychology but without cognition
proper’ (p. 16). And this is clearly intended as a reductio ad absurdum of the narrow
conception of mental states and of cognitivism in general.
But this ‘new concept’ of representation is not new at all: it is simply the concept of non-
relational intentionality, which Descombes endorsed earlier in the book. And it would
distort the entire earlier discussion of intentionality to say that intentional states and acts
‘do not represent’. A belief about unicorns represents unicorns; it does not represent
nothing. This would only be a ‘new’ concept of representation if it were true that the ‘old’
(or more intuitive, natural or commonsensical) concept of representation implied that
representation must be relational. But, assuming that talk of intentionality and talk of
representation go hand in hand—something Descombes does not deny, as we shall see—it
is not true that the ordinary concept of representation implies that representation is
relational. Indeed, this was the burden of Descombes’s discussion of intentionality at the
beginning of the book. Even by Descombes’s own lights, then, a defender of the narrow
conception of mental states does not have to say that they are ‘representations which do
not represent’. And since the argument of chapter 11 was intended to commit the narrow
conception to this absurd conclusion, we must conclude that the argument fails. Whatever
the problem with the narrow conception is, it is not that it introduces a new or bizarre
concept of representation.
Descombes holds, then, that intentionality is non-relational, and that perception is
relational. He therefore must deny that perception is a form of intentionality. So he cannot
think that intentionality is the essential characteristic of mental phenomena, since perception
is not intentional. But Descombes does not discuss this non-intentional conception of
perception, and therefore leaves the role of intentionality in what he calls his ‘intentionalist’
theory of mind rather obscure. Nonetheless, it is clear that one thing which is supposed to be
new about this intentionalist theory is the role that it assigns to action and activity in
accounting for mentality. This is the second main theme I will discuss.
One of the main errors of mental philosophy, Descombes argues, is that it does not treat
representation as appropriately active. Descombes is keen to insist that there is nothing
wrong with talking about representation as such. In itself, the word ‘representation’ is
‘innocuous’ (p. 10). The point is how the word is used:
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Among mental philosophers, representation is not a vital activity and in this
regard differs from other activities like extracting information from the flux and
variation of one’s environment or drawing up a plan of action so as to be ready to
move within a milieu whose complete contours can only be guessed at based on
the partial information at hand. Representation, for a subject or ‘intelligent
system’, involves entering into a certain relationship with a cognitive entity: for
the mentalists of the past, a representational idea; for those of the present, a real
and physical symbol located within the organism. (p. 10)
One source of mental philosophy’s confusion here is supposed to be the fact that it attributes
to parts of the thinker states and capacities what can only be intelligibly attributed to the
whole. This is described at one point as ‘the difficulty for every mental philosophy: How can
the attributions of a personal subject be transferred to a part of that subject?’ (p. 186). Mental
philosophy looks for representations inside the organism, and ends up saying things like
‘the brain represents the world’ or (even worse) ‘the brain thinks’.
Descombes does not doubt that the brain has something to do with thinking, he argues
that we must distinguish between the conditions for thinking and the abilities which
constitute thinking: ‘the conditions in which we can do something are not those abilities
themselves’ (p. 72). Once we make this distinction, then we can see that ‘the physiological
conditions for psychological phenomena are in the brain. . .[but] these phenomena of mind
are only phenomena of mind insofar as they exist outside, in the public world’ (p. 73). His
view is nicely summed up as follows:
mind is present in its phenomena and therefore in the world, in symbolic
practices and institutions. Within people’s heads, there are literally only the
personal (and therefore physical or physiological) conditions for participation in
these practices and institutions. The mental, however, is everywhere that it
manifests itself, therefore in both discourse and action, whose conditions of
existence are of a holistic nature. (p. 65)
Descombes’s views here involve the following four claims: (i) the person is the locus of
mental activity, not the brain; (ii) action is a mental category; (iii) mental activity
presupposes the existence of social institutions; (iv) mental phenomena are holistic in
character.
Claims (i) and (ii) cannot really be matters for disagreement between Descombes and
the mental philosopher. For in defending (i), Descombes finds himself in the company of
such an eminent defender of mental philosophy as Chomsky, who once wrote that ‘people
think, not their brains, which do not, though their brains provide the mechanisms of
thought’ (1995: 8). There is nothing in the essence of mental philosophy in general, or
cognitivism in particular, which forces it to say that the brain must think, or forces it to
deny the distinction between psychological capacities and the conditions for their
possibility (indeed, some cognitivists talk explicitly about ‘sub-personal’ mechanisms
forming the ‘enabling conditions’ of mental processes and activity). Similarly, there is no
reason for a defender of mental philosophy to deny that action is a mental phenomenon;
indeed, many orthodox philosophers of mind see action/behaviour as a fundamental
mental category, and try to understand mental life partly in terms of it. Descombes is
anxious to insist that mental philosophy denies real cognition or psychic life because it
denies that behaviour is mental or psychical; but it is not clear why mental philosophy is
supposed to be committed to this.
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The real differences begin to emerge when considering (iii) and (iv). The claim
that mental activity presupposes the existence of social institutions in which it is
embedded (claim (iii)) is part of Descombes’s externalist conception of mind, and
as we saw above, sits unhappily alongside his denial that any intentionality is relational.
And the claim (iv) that mental phenomena are holistic is certainly one which many
cognitivists see as inimical to their enterprise (see especially Fodor 1998). However, just as
there are mental philosophers who are externalists (as we noted above) there are also
mental philosophers who are holists (see Peacocke 1992 and Block 1986 for examples). So
once again it becomes rather hard to locate the essence of Descombes’s objection to mental
philosophy.
Perhaps Descombes’s difficulties in pinning down the essence of mental philosophy are
more due to its own protean character than to his procrustean assumptions. If we were to
find one thing which characterises all of the philosophers attacked here—apart from their
antipathy to Wittgenstein—it would only be a doctrine as vague as naturalism. And it is
very rare for enlightening philosophy to be generated by a full-frontal attack on vague
doctrines. Out of the vague comes only the vague. Descombes does not spend much time
on the subject of naturalism—a good thing, in my opinion—and instead focuses on specific
theses put forward by specific naturalist philosophers. But lacking the enthusiasm or
goodwill to interpret mental philosophy with any charity, Descombes tends to attribute
traits to the whole which are only true of the parts (the converse of the intellectual error he
attributes to cognitivists!). Directed on mental philosophy or cognitivism as a whole, his
attacks fall short of their target. This is, surely, only to be expected; for it is very unlikely
that a philosophical position of the complexity and lineage of cognitivism has nothing to
be said for it at all. The Mind’s Provisions could become the kind of book which is taken up
enthusiastically by people who dislike contemporary philosophy of mind and want to see
it as resting on some fundamental mistake. My own view is that it is as unlikely that there
is such a mistake as it is that there is one thing called contemporary philosophy of mind, or
mental philosophy.
Tim Crane Department of Philosophy
University College London
Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT
UK
tim.crane@ucl.ac.uk
NOTES
1 Newcomers to this area should be warned, however, that Descombes’s under-
standing of the issue of externalism is not as secure as it should be. Consider for example,
his claim on p. 202 that Putnam’s concern in ‘The Meaning of ‘‘Meaning’’’ (Putnam 1975),
was to refute the claim that meaning determines reference or extension. This is a mistake:
Putnam retains (without argument) the claim that meaning determines reference (i.e.
difference in reference implies difference in meaning) and rejects the claim that knowing
the meaning of a term is a matter of being in a psychological state. Indeed, without the
claim that meaning determines reference, Putnam could not argue for his externalism in
the way he does, viz. by arguing that because psychological doppelga¨ngers are referring to
different things, then they mean something different by their words. The assumption that
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meaning determines reference is an essential step in the argument for externalism. Without
it, an assertion of the externalist thesis would beg the question.
2 I have been helped in coming to understand The Mind’s Provisions by a symposium
on the book organised by the Forum for European Philosophy in January 2003, and
attended by Professor Descombes himself.
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